Risk is a risky word. Already prone to misinterpretation among people who share a language and a culture, the difficulties multiply dangerously when it moves across borders. “風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”這個(gè)詞本身就蘊(yùn)含著風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。即使是語言和文化背景相同的人，對(duì)這個(gè)詞的理解也可能存在差異，而不同國家的人要想就“風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”統(tǒng)一認(rèn)識(shí)更是難上加難。 What a Wall Street trader might define as moderately risky may seem downright insane to a Japanese retail broker; what an oil pipeline engineer in Brazil might characterise as gung-ho may appear overcautious to his revenue-chasing chief executive in London. 在華爾街交易員看來也許只是略有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的資產(chǎn)，在日本零售經(jīng)紀(jì)人眼中則可能是近乎瘋狂的投機(jī)。巴西輸油管線工程師眼中“頭腦發(fā)熱”的項(xiàng)目，在其追逐利潤(rùn)的駐倫敦首席執(zhí)行官看來則可能過于保守。 The perception of risk and uncertainty is very different across cultures, says Javier Gimeno, a professor of international risk and strategic management at Insead. In some cultures, there is a very high level of uncertainty avoidance. People avoid discussing things where there is uncertainty, or imitate their competitors just to feel the safety of doing the same thing. In some Mediterranean and Arabic cultures, he has observed a strong sense of fatalism or destiny. You dont want to talk about possible scenarios and possible risks. No one wants to be the person bringing up the risk, which makes the communication of risks difficult. 歐洲工商管理學(xué)院(Insead)國際風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與戰(zhàn)略管理教授哈維爾吉梅諾(Javier Gimeno)表示：“不同文化對(duì)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和不確定性的認(rèn)識(shí)存在很大差異。一些文化對(duì)不確定性的規(guī)避程度極高。人們不愿談?wù)摬淮_定的事情，或者常常去模仿競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，而這只是為了求得一種從眾的安全感。”他發(fā)現(xiàn)，地中海和阿拉伯地區(qū)的一些文化，“具有很強(qiáng)的宿命色彩。人們不愿談?wù)摽赡芮樾位蚩赡茱L(fēng)險(xiǎn)，不愿把風(fēng)險(xiǎn)當(dāng)作話題。這使得外人很難與他們溝通風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題”。 Since the explosion of BPs Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico two years ago, students of risk have been poring over the causes. An important factor appears to have been a failure in communication between BPs London headquarters and its US operations over the balance between internal control and operational aggression. 自兩年前英國石油(BP)馬孔多(Macondo)油井爆炸事故發(fā)生以來，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理領(lǐng)域的研究者們就一直在探討這起事故發(fā)生的原因。BP倫敦總部和美國分公司在平衡內(nèi)部控制與業(yè)務(wù)推進(jìn)方面存在溝通上的失誤，這可能是導(dǎo)致事故發(fā)生的重要原因之一。 Richard Anderson, head of the Institute of Risk Management, a professional training body in London, says that years before the accident, Lord Browne, then chief executive of BP, told his internal auditors that the philosophy for internal control was we dont like surprises. In the UK, says Mr Anderson, managers took this to mean they should alert their superiors to any looming problems, whereas in the US, some misconstrued Lord Brownes instructions to mean nasty surprises were to be hidden.Language always comes with a set of cultural baggage, says Mr Anderson, who has studied the affair. That was definitely evident in that case. 位于倫敦的職業(yè)培訓(xùn)機(jī)構(gòu)“風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理研究所”(Institute of Risk Management)的所長(zhǎng)理查德安德森(Richard Anderson)指出，在這起事故發(fā)生的若干年前，時(shí)任BP首席執(zhí)行官的布朗勛爵(Lord Browne)曾對(duì)內(nèi)部審計(jì)人員表示，BP的內(nèi)控理念就是“我們不喜歡意外”。安德森說，在英國，管理者們把這句話理解為應(yīng)當(dāng)就任何快要出現(xiàn)的問題向上級(jí)發(fā)出預(yù)警；而在美國，布朗勛爵的這句話被錯(cuò)誤理解為要“報(bào)喜不報(bào)憂”。對(duì)此事有過研究的安德森指出：“語言離不開其特定的文化背景，這一點(diǎn)在整件事中非常明顯。” Since the financial crisis, banks have been criticised for relying too much on value-at-risk models–which calculate the risk of a banks position based on historic probability of adverse events over time–that failed to account for the severity of what was to occur in 2008. But, says Prof Gimeno, VAR remains a useful tool provided it is only one of several used by organisations. The challenge is that so much risk can escape the scrutiny of even the most sophisticated risk management tools. 自金融危機(jī)發(fā)生以來，銀行業(yè)一直因過度倚賴風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值(VaR)模型而飽受批評(píng)。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值模型基于消極事件發(fā)生的歷史概率來計(jì)算銀行頭寸面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。批評(píng)人士稱，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值模型未能充分估計(jì)到2008年事件的嚴(yán)重性。但吉梅諾教授認(rèn)為，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值仍是一個(gè)有用工具——前提是金融機(jī)構(gòu)在使用這個(gè)工具的同時(shí)，也要使用其他風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制工具。當(dāng)前的挑戰(zhàn)在于，即使用上最先進(jìn)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制工具，也無法確保很大一部分風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不成為“漏網(wǎng)之魚”。 Oil companies, for example, measure risk in all kinds of ways, from political risk and operational risk to the macroeconomic factors that might lead to fluctuating oil prices. But these measurements are next to useless without open communication and shared assumptions about language. 舉例來說，石油公司以多種多樣的方式來度量風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，其度量指標(biāo)涵蓋政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、運(yùn)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以及可導(dǎo)致油價(jià)出現(xiàn)波動(dòng)的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)因素。但如果公司內(nèi)部溝通不暢、對(duì)于相關(guān)語言的理解不一致，上述度量的作用將大打折扣。 An important dimension in risk management is the extent to which there is vertical communication within a company, says Prof Gimeno. Compare a Dutch company – where an employee can talk easily to his superior – to a Japanese or Korean company, where there is a big separation between the ranks. This can lead to communication not being pushed upward. This isnt just company cultures, its national culture. The potential nightmare arises when a company knows less than the individuals within it because of lack of communication between the ranks. 吉梅諾教授稱：“風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理中很重要的一個(gè)方面是考察公司內(nèi)部上下級(jí)之間的信息溝通有多么順暢。在一家荷蘭公司里，普通雇員可以很容易地與其上級(jí)進(jìn)行交流。而在日本或韓國企業(yè)里，上下級(jí)之間等級(jí)森嚴(yán)，導(dǎo)致信息很難由下到上傳遞。這已不再僅僅是公司文化問題，而是屬于國家文化范疇。”當(dāng)公司上下級(jí)之間溝通不暢導(dǎo)致管理層掌握的信息少于員工時(shí)，嚴(yán)重的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)隱患就產(chǎn)生了。

The growing field of enterprise risk management seeks to crack this problem by guiding organisations on improving structures and governance around risk. It is about settling on a way to identify, assess and respond to risk in [a] way that is culturally consistent across the organisation, says Mr Anderson. Organisations are starting to define their risk so that language does not break down across boundaries.

快速發(fā)展的企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理(ERM)理論試圖通過引導(dǎo)企業(yè)以風(fēng)險(xiǎn)為中心優(yōu)化架構(gòu)和治理，來破解上述問題。安德森表示：“ERM旨在確定一種機(jī)制，使企業(yè)各部門能在統(tǒng)一認(rèn)識(shí)的基礎(chǔ)上識(shí)別、評(píng)估和應(yīng)對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。企業(yè)正在著手制定對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的定義，以確保自己在各國的業(yè)務(wù)部門不在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)認(rèn)識(shí)方面產(chǎn)生差異。” The relatively new breed of risk professionals also aims toprovide the kind of hard intelligence that will pierce what Mr Anderson calls the perfect place arrogance that can beset multinationals. Companies with strong national identities risk thinking that what they do at home will work equally well abroad. They think just because weve been successful on Wall Street, we can do the same thing in London, Tokyo and Frankfurt.Such thinking can be challenged with trenchant assessments of the risks present in each new market. 相對(duì)新興的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理專業(yè)人士，還試圖通過提供那類“硬情報(bào)”，來破除安德森所謂的“完美地自負(fù)”(perfect place arrogance)，這種自負(fù)可能給跨國企業(yè)帶來困擾。具有鮮明地域特色的公司可能會(huì)認(rèn)為，自己在本國的業(yè)務(wù)模式在海外市場(chǎng)也同樣有效。“他們認(rèn)為，‘既然在華爾街能夠取得成功，我們?cè)趥惗亍|京和法蘭克福同樣也能成功’。”通過對(duì)各個(gè)新市場(chǎng)中存在的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)做出明晰的評(píng)估，我們就可對(duì)這種自負(fù)的想法提出質(zhì)疑。 The challenge ofERM is to find the right balance between operating as yet another audit system and building risk-orientated thinking into day-to-day management. ERM面臨的挑戰(zhàn)在于，要在成為又一套內(nèi)部審計(jì)系統(tǒng)和將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)導(dǎo)向型思維融入日常管理之間找到合適的平衡點(diǎn)。 John Ludlow, vice-president for global risk management at InterContinental Hotels Group, runs a $100m budget to manage risk across IHGs 4,600 hotels in 100 countries. What ties IHG employees everyday actions to the companys strategic view of risk is a determination to champion and protect our brands. This sense of the brand being the most important asset is what aligns the many activities that fall under the category of risk. 約翰勒德洛(John Ludlow)是洲際酒店集團(tuán)(InterContinental Hotels Group)全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理副總裁，他負(fù)責(zé)以1億美元的年預(yù)算管理集團(tuán)在全球100個(gè)國家的4600家酒店的業(yè)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。勒德洛表示，將員工日常行為與集團(tuán)風(fēng)控戰(zhàn)略觀聯(lián)結(jié)起來的因素，是一種“捍衛(wèi)和維護(hù)公司品牌”的決心。這種將品牌看做最重要資產(chǎn)的意識(shí)，是集團(tuán)管理者在處理各種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)事件時(shí)的共同出發(fā)點(diǎn)。 Mr Ludlow says understanding context–more so than language–is the first step in any global risk management plan. In any country in the world, people consider risk in terms of the law, logic and relationships, but in different orders of importance: In China, its relationships first and the law third. In the US, its law first, then logic, then relationships. 勒德洛稱，理解不同地區(qū)的文化背景是制定全球性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制方案的第一步，它比理解語言方面的差異更重要。在全球任何一個(gè)國家，人們?cè)诜治鲲L(fēng)險(xiǎn)時(shí)都會(huì)從法律、邏輯和人際關(guān)系三方面考慮；但不同國家的人對(duì)這三者重要程度的排序存在差異。“在中國，人際關(guān)系排第一位，法律排第三；在美國，則是法律排第一位，其次是邏輯，最后才是人際關(guān)系。” At IHG, risks range from picking local developers and operators to ensuring the safety of guests and staff during any natural disaster or attack. 洲際酒店集團(tuán)面臨一系列風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素，從選擇合適的本地開發(fā)商和運(yùn)營商，到在發(fā)生自然災(zāi)害或遭遇襲擊時(shí)保證賓客和員工的安全。 Mr Ludlows team includes recruits from the military and intelligence services for their expertise at gathering information, as well as operational experts capable of implementing a 2,000-page volume of policies and standards. The latter range from knife safety in kitchens to evacuation plans in the event of extreme political unrest. We have e-learning and safety training in different languages for people at different levels of the organisation, he says. Each day, there are checklists, 10-minute online campaigns and poster campaigns. 勒德洛負(fù)責(zé)的團(tuán)隊(duì)招收了一批曾在軍事和情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)工作的員工，因?yàn)檫@些人擅長(zhǎng)收集信息；另外還包括幾位運(yùn)營專家，這些人有能力將厚達(dá)2000頁的風(fēng)控政策和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)貫徹實(shí)施。這些政策和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)涵蓋各個(gè)方面，從廚房中的刀具安全，到爆發(fā)嚴(yán)重政治動(dòng)亂時(shí)的人員撤離方案。勒德洛稱：“我們有不同語言版本的網(wǎng)絡(luò)學(xué)習(xí)和安全培訓(xùn)內(nèi)容，供各個(gè)級(jí)別的員工學(xué)習(xí)。除此之外，我們每天還列出風(fēng)險(xiǎn)排查清單，播出時(shí)長(zhǎng)10分鐘的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)教育網(wǎng)絡(luò)宣傳片，并張貼宣傳海報(bào)。” The greatest pitfalls in managing risk across borders, he says, emerge from assuming too much. When dealing with fellow English speakers, it is easy to imagine that a shared language means shared assumptions that the English, Americans and Australians think the same thing because they are using the same words. 勒德洛指出，企業(yè)在全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理方面存在的最大隱患在于過于想當(dāng)然。例如，在與和自己一樣以英語為母語的人打交道時(shí)，管理者很容易認(rèn)為語言相同意味著想法相同，即英國人、美國人和澳大利亞人在使用相同的措辭時(shí)表達(dá)的是同一意思。 With less familiar cultures, all kinds of unpredicted mistakes can occur.In your own culture, you can assume so much. But when youre dealing with different cultures, you can do your best but you have to go further to make sure that what you both think youve done is the same thing.如果交流雙方的文化背景差異較大，這種想當(dāng)然可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致各種意想不到的誤會(huì)。“如果交流雙方來自同一文化背景，這種想當(dāng)然還問題不大。如果你在與來自不同文化背景的人交流，那么你在侃侃而談的同時(shí)，有必要進(jìn)一步確認(rèn)一下對(duì)方對(duì)你所說的話的理解和你想表達(dá)的意思是一回事。”

Risk is a risky word. Already prone to misinterpretation among people who share a language and a culture, the difficulties multiply dangerously when it moves across borders. “風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”這個(gè)詞本身就蘊(yùn)含著風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。即使是語言和文化背景相同的人，對(duì)這個(gè)詞的理解也可能存在差異，而不同國家的人要想就“風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”統(tǒng)一認(rèn)識(shí)更是難上加難。 What a Wall Street trader might define as moderately risky may seem downright insane to a Japanese retail broker; what an oil pipeline engineer in Brazil might characterise as gung-ho may appear overcautious to his revenue-chasing chief executive in London. 在華爾街交易員看來也許只是略有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的資產(chǎn)，在日本零售經(jīng)紀(jì)人眼中則可能是近乎瘋狂的投機(jī)。巴西輸油管線工程師眼中“頭腦發(fā)熱”的項(xiàng)目，在其追逐利潤(rùn)的駐倫敦首席執(zhí)行官看來則可能過于保守。 The perception of risk and uncertainty is very different across cultures, says Javier Gimeno, a professor of international risk and strategic management at Insead. In some cultures, there is a very high level of uncertainty avoidance. People avoid discussing things where there is uncertainty, or imitate their competitors just to feel the safety of doing the same thing. In some Mediterranean and Arabic cultures, he has observed a strong sense of fatalism or destiny. You dont want to talk about possible scenarios and possible risks. No one wants to be the person bringing up the risk, which makes the communication of risks difficult. 歐洲工商管理學(xué)院(Insead)國際風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與戰(zhàn)略管理教授哈維爾吉梅諾(Javier Gimeno)表示：“不同文化對(duì)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和不確定性的認(rèn)識(shí)存在很大差異。一些文化對(duì)不確定性的規(guī)避程度極高。人們不愿談?wù)摬淮_定的事情，或者常常去模仿競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，而這只是為了求得一種從眾的安全感。”他發(fā)現(xiàn)，地中海和阿拉伯地區(qū)的一些文化，“具有很強(qiáng)的宿命色彩。人們不愿談?wù)摽赡芮樾位蚩赡茱L(fēng)險(xiǎn)，不愿把風(fēng)險(xiǎn)當(dāng)作話題。這使得外人很難與他們溝通風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題”。 Since the explosion of BPs Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico two years ago, students of risk have been poring over the causes. An important factor appears to have been a failure in communication between BPs London headquarters and its US operations over the balance between internal control and operational aggression. 自兩年前英國石油(BP)馬孔多(Macondo)油井爆炸事故發(fā)生以來，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理領(lǐng)域的研究者們就一直在探討這起事故發(fā)生的原因。BP倫敦總部和美國分公司在平衡內(nèi)部控制與業(yè)務(wù)推進(jìn)方面存在溝通上的失誤，這可能是導(dǎo)致事故發(fā)生的重要原因之一。 Richard Anderson, head of the Institute of Risk Management, a professional training body in London, says that years before the accident, Lord Browne, then chief executive of BP, told his internal auditors that the philosophy for internal control was we dont like surprises. In the UK, says Mr Anderson, managers took this to mean they should alert their superiors to any looming problems, whereas in the US, some misconstrued Lord Brownes instructions to mean nasty surprises were to be hidden.Language always comes with a set of cultural baggage, says Mr Anderson, who has studied the affair. That was definitely evident in that case. 位于倫敦的職業(yè)培訓(xùn)機(jī)構(gòu)“風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理研究所”(Institute of Risk Management)的所長(zhǎng)理查德安德森(Richard Anderson)指出，在這起事故發(fā)生的若干年前，時(shí)任BP首席執(zhí)行官的布朗勛爵(Lord Browne)曾對(duì)內(nèi)部審計(jì)人員表示，BP的內(nèi)控理念就是“我們不喜歡意外”。安德森說，在英國，管理者們把這句話理解為應(yīng)當(dāng)就任何快要出現(xiàn)的問題向上級(jí)發(fā)出預(yù)警；而在美國，布朗勛爵的這句話被錯(cuò)誤理解為要“報(bào)喜不報(bào)憂”。對(duì)此事有過研究的安德森指出：“語言離不開其特定的文化背景，這一點(diǎn)在整件事中非常明顯。” Since the financial crisis, banks have been criticised for relying too much on value-at-risk models–which calculate the risk of a banks position based on historic probability of adverse events over time–that failed to account for the severity of what was to occur in 2008. But, says Prof Gimeno, VAR remains a useful tool provided it is only one of several used by organisations. The challenge is that so much risk can escape the scrutiny of even the most sophisticated risk management tools. 自金融危機(jī)發(fā)生以來，銀行業(yè)一直因過度倚賴風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值(VaR)模型而飽受批評(píng)。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值模型基于消極事件發(fā)生的歷史概率來計(jì)算銀行頭寸面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。批評(píng)人士稱，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值模型未能充分估計(jì)到2008年事件的嚴(yán)重性。但吉梅諾教授認(rèn)為，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值仍是一個(gè)有用工具——前提是金融機(jī)構(gòu)在使用這個(gè)工具的同時(shí)，也要使用其他風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制工具。當(dāng)前的挑戰(zhàn)在于，即使用上最先進(jìn)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制工具，也無法確保很大一部分風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不成為“漏網(wǎng)之魚”。 Oil companies, for example, measure risk in all kinds of ways, from political risk and operational risk to the macroeconomic factors that might lead to fluctuating oil prices. But these measurements are next to useless without open communication and shared assumptions about language. 舉例來說，石油公司以多種多樣的方式來度量風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，其度量指標(biāo)涵蓋政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、運(yùn)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以及可導(dǎo)致油價(jià)出現(xiàn)波動(dòng)的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)因素。但如果公司內(nèi)部溝通不暢、對(duì)于相關(guān)語言的理解不一致，上述度量的作用將大打折扣。 An important dimension in risk management is the extent to which there is vertical communication within a company, says Prof Gimeno. Compare a Dutch company – where an employee can talk easily to his superior – to a Japanese or Korean company, where there is a big separation between the ranks. This can lead to communication not being pushed upward. This isnt just company cultures, its national culture. The potential nightmare arises when a company knows less than the individuals within it because of lack of communication between the ranks. 吉梅諾教授稱：“風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理中很重要的一個(gè)方面是考察公司內(nèi)部上下級(jí)之間的信息溝通有多么順暢。在一家荷蘭公司里，普通雇員可以很容易地與其上級(jí)進(jìn)行交流。而在日本或韓國企業(yè)里，上下級(jí)之間等級(jí)森嚴(yán)，導(dǎo)致信息很難由下到上傳遞。這已不再僅僅是公司文化問題，而是屬于國家文化范疇。”當(dāng)公司上下級(jí)之間溝通不暢導(dǎo)致管理層掌握的信息少于員工時(shí)，嚴(yán)重的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)隱患就產(chǎn)生了。

The growing field of enterprise risk management seeks to crack this problem by guiding organisations on improving structures and governance around risk. It is about settling on a way to identify, assess and respond to risk in [a] way that is culturally consistent across the organisation, says Mr Anderson. Organisations are starting to define their risk so that language does not break down across boundaries.

快速發(fā)展的企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理(ERM)理論試圖通過引導(dǎo)企業(yè)以風(fēng)險(xiǎn)為中心優(yōu)化架構(gòu)和治理，來破解上述問題。安德森表示：“ERM旨在確定一種機(jī)制，使企業(yè)各部門能在統(tǒng)一認(rèn)識(shí)的基礎(chǔ)上識(shí)別、評(píng)估和應(yīng)對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。企業(yè)正在著手制定對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的定義，以確保自己在各國的業(yè)務(wù)部門不在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)認(rèn)識(shí)方面產(chǎn)生差異。” The relatively new breed of risk professionals also aims toprovide the kind of hard intelligence that will pierce what Mr Anderson calls the perfect place arrogance that can beset multinationals. Companies with strong national identities risk thinking that what they do at home will work equally well abroad. They think just because weve been successful on Wall Street, we can do the same thing in London, Tokyo and Frankfurt.Such thinking can be challenged with trenchant assessments of the risks present in each new market. 相對(duì)新興的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理專業(yè)人士，還試圖通過提供那類“硬情報(bào)”，來破除安德森所謂的“完美地自負(fù)”(perfect place arrogance)，這種自負(fù)可能給跨國企業(yè)帶來困擾。具有鮮明地域特色的公司可能會(huì)認(rèn)為，自己在本國的業(yè)務(wù)模式在海外市場(chǎng)也同樣有效。“他們認(rèn)為，‘既然在華爾街能夠取得成功，我們?cè)趥惗亍|京和法蘭克福同樣也能成功’。”通過對(duì)各個(gè)新市場(chǎng)中存在的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)做出明晰的評(píng)估，我們就可對(duì)這種自負(fù)的想法提出質(zhì)疑。 The challenge ofERM is to find the right balance between operating as yet another audit system and building risk-orientated thinking into day-to-day management. ERM面臨的挑戰(zhàn)在于，要在成為又一套內(nèi)部審計(jì)系統(tǒng)和將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)導(dǎo)向型思維融入日常管理之間找到合適的平衡點(diǎn)。 John Ludlow, vice-president for global risk management at InterContinental Hotels Group, runs a $100m budget to manage risk across IHGs 4,600 hotels in 100 countries. What ties IHG employees everyday actions to the companys strategic view of risk is a determination to champion and protect our brands. This sense of the brand being the most important asset is what aligns the many activities that fall under the category of risk. 約翰勒德洛(John Ludlow)是洲際酒店集團(tuán)(InterContinental Hotels Group)全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理副總裁，他負(fù)責(zé)以1億美元的年預(yù)算管理集團(tuán)在全球100個(gè)國家的4600家酒店的業(yè)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。勒德洛表示，將員工日常行為與集團(tuán)風(fēng)控戰(zhàn)略觀聯(lián)結(jié)起來的因素，是一種“捍衛(wèi)和維護(hù)公司品牌”的決心。這種將品牌看做最重要資產(chǎn)的意識(shí)，是集團(tuán)管理者在處理各種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)事件時(shí)的共同出發(fā)點(diǎn)。 Mr Ludlow says understanding context–more so than language–is the first step in any global risk management plan. In any country in the world, people consider risk in terms of the law, logic and relationships, but in different orders of importance: In China, its relationships first and the law third. In the US, its law first, then logic, then relationships. 勒德洛稱，理解不同地區(qū)的文化背景是制定全球性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制方案的第一步，它比理解語言方面的差異更重要。在全球任何一個(gè)國家，人們?cè)诜治鲲L(fēng)險(xiǎn)時(shí)都會(huì)從法律、邏輯和人際關(guān)系三方面考慮；但不同國家的人對(duì)這三者重要程度的排序存在差異。“在中國，人際關(guān)系排第一位，法律排第三；在美國，則是法律排第一位，其次是邏輯，最后才是人際關(guān)系。” At IHG, risks range from picking local developers and operators to ensuring the safety of guests and staff during any natural disaster or attack. 洲際酒店集團(tuán)面臨一系列風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素，從選擇合適的本地開發(fā)商和運(yùn)營商，到在發(fā)生自然災(zāi)害或遭遇襲擊時(shí)保證賓客和員工的安全。 Mr Ludlows team includes recruits from the military and intelligence services for their expertise at gathering information, as well as operational experts capable of implementing a 2,000-page volume of policies and standards. The latter range from knife safety in kitchens to evacuation plans in the event of extreme political unrest. We have e-learning and safety training in different languages for people at different levels of the organisation, he says. Each day, there are checklists, 10-minute online campaigns and poster campaigns. 勒德洛負(fù)責(zé)的團(tuán)隊(duì)招收了一批曾在軍事和情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)工作的員工，因?yàn)檫@些人擅長(zhǎng)收集信息；另外還包括幾位運(yùn)營專家，這些人有能力將厚達(dá)2000頁的風(fēng)控政策和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)貫徹實(shí)施。這些政策和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)涵蓋各個(gè)方面，從廚房中的刀具安全，到爆發(fā)嚴(yán)重政治動(dòng)亂時(shí)的人員撤離方案。勒德洛稱：“我們有不同語言版本的網(wǎng)絡(luò)學(xué)習(xí)和安全培訓(xùn)內(nèi)容，供各個(gè)級(jí)別的員工學(xué)習(xí)。除此之外，我們每天還列出風(fēng)險(xiǎn)排查清單，播出時(shí)長(zhǎng)10分鐘的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)教育網(wǎng)絡(luò)宣傳片，并張貼宣傳海報(bào)。” The greatest pitfalls in managing risk across borders, he says, emerge from assuming too much. When dealing with fellow English speakers, it is easy to imagine that a shared language means shared assumptions that the English, Americans and Australians think the same thing because they are using the same words. 勒德洛指出，企業(yè)在全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理方面存在的最大隱患在于過于想當(dāng)然。例如，在與和自己一樣以英語為母語的人打交道時(shí)，管理者很容易認(rèn)為語言相同意味著想法相同，即英國人、美國人和澳大利亞人在使用相同的措辭時(shí)表達(dá)的是同一意思。 With less familiar cultures, all kinds of unpredicted mistakes can occur.In your own culture, you can assume so much. But when youre dealing with different cultures, you can do your best but you have to go further to make sure that what you both think youve done is the same thing.如果交流雙方的文化背景差異較大，這種想當(dāng)然可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致各種意想不到的誤會(huì)。“如果交流雙方來自同一文化背景，這種想當(dāng)然還問題不大。如果你在與來自不同文化背景的人交流，那么你在侃侃而談的同時(shí)，有必要進(jìn)一步確認(rèn)一下對(duì)方對(duì)你所說的話的理解和你想表達(dá)的意思是一回事。”