Joined-up thinking

　　以整體思維設計歐洲債券

　　Can a limited version of Eurobonds help solve theeuro crisis?

　　限制版的歐洲債券能否解決歐債危機?

　　Anyone labouring under the illusion that the eurocrisis could be solved by liquidity provision fromthe European Central Bank , howevermunificent, has been disabused. By encouragingbanks to stock up on domestic government debt, the ECB s loans have reinforced thepernicious links between weak banks and weak governments. That connection is currentlyhurting Spain. Meanwhile, a German-inspired fiscal compact to insert public-debt brakesinto national laws does nothing to help countries such as Italy climb out of the debt pit.

　　人們曾經對歐洲央行抱有不切實際的想法，認為只要它增加流動性供給，歐債危機便能藥到病除。但現實情況是，無論歐洲央行出手怎么慷慨大方，依然無法扭轉局勢。歐洲央行向銀行業發放貸款，鼓勵它們購買自己國家發行的政府債券。各國銀行和政府本就已經虛弱不堪，上述做法更加加劇了二者之間的極為有害的聯系。西班牙現在便深受這種毒害之苦。與此同時，德國發起的財政契約要求各國將控制公共債務水平的條款納入本國法律中，這絲毫無益于西班牙這樣深陷債務泥潭的國家獲得救助。

　　Eurobonds, shorthand for euro-area sovereign debts that are jointly guaranteed by the 17member countries, could provide a solution. In aggregate, the public finances of thecurrency block compare favourably with countries such as America which can borrow atdirt-cheap rates . But replacing all national government bonds with collectively underwrittendebt is a non-starter. A fully mutualised euro-zone debt market would be enormousat 8trillion Euro, not far short of America sand thus very liquid.

　　歐洲債券是歐元區主權債券的縮寫。這種由十七個國家聯合擔保的債券可能為解決歐債危機提供某種出路?？偟膩砜矗瑲W元區集團的公共財政狀況與美國相比毫不遜色，但是卻無法享受到后者那種以極低的利率借款的好處。。但因此取消歐元區所有國家的政府債券，并代之以各國共同承保的歐洲債券，無疑又是不現實的。一個完全統一的歐元區債券市場將極為龐大市值約為8萬億歐元，接近美國債券市場的規模從而也將極具流動性。

　　That would lower average borrowing costs a bit. But the big gains through lower yields wouldgo to the block s fiscal sinners , while the good guys would becharged more to tap the markets than they are now. Such a move risks undermining the euroarea s public finances in the long run by taking pressure off renegades. To prevent that,national budgets would have to be tightly controlled at a euro-zone level, entailing muchdeeper political integration than is currently conceivable.

　　若這一設想得以實現，歐元區的平均借款成本將會有少許的下降。到那時，敗壞財政紀律的罪犯將享受到債券收益率下降的好處，而行為端正的好人則要承受比現在更高的發債成本。從長期來看，這種為惡棍緩解壓力的做法將毀壞歐元區的公共財政基礎。若要避免此種不幸，各國的財政預算必須從歐元區總體層面上加以嚴格控制，這勢必要求各國打破思想上的框框，將政治一體化的進程向前繼續推進。

　　Any feasible plan for Eurobonds will therefore have to be on a partial basis. That meanslimiting the scope of joint guarantees to specific portions of member states sovereigndebt, or setting a defined lifespan to the guarantees. One idea is to confine the maturityof Eurobonds to short-term debt. Wim Boonstra, chief economist of Rabobank in theNetherlands, advocates a facility for euro-zone countries to finance themselves for four yearsthrough jointly-guaranteed debt of up to two years in maturity. This plan would excludeGreece, Ireland and Portugal while they are receiving rescue finance, but it would take theheat off Italy and Spain and provide their banks with a safe common asset. One snag is that itencompasses the very maturity at which their governments already find it easiest to borrow.Another is that by encouraging countries to issue debt at shorter maturities, the programmewould create a bigger refinancing hump at the point when it was wound up.

　　無論歐洲債券采取何種發行方案，都將是一個類似半成品的事物。這意味著，或者成員國主權債務的某些部分，或者債券的期限，將受到限制。有人就建議將歐洲債券界定為短期債務工具。荷蘭拉博銀行首席經濟學家維姆布恩斯塔主張，歐元區國家應采取聯合擔保的形式，發行一種單期期限不超過兩年，總期限四年的共同融資工具。按照他的計劃，一方面，希臘、愛爾蘭和葡萄牙由于已經接受了救助資金，將不會成為聯合擔保的對象;另一方面，意大利和西班牙將由此獲得喘息的機會，兩國的銀行業也將獲得歐洲債券這種比較安全的一般性資產。但是這個方案存在的一大問題是，即使沒有歐洲債券，意大利政府和西班牙政府現在已經能比較輕松地獲得這一期限內的貸款。況且，如果各國在這一方案的激勵下都來發行短期債券，那么等到借新還舊的時候就會面對更大的融資壓力。

　　A much more ambitious scheme from Bruegel, a Brussels-based think-tank, first outlinedin 2010, would use the original Maastricht-treaty cap for public debt of 60% of GDPmorehonoured in the breach than the observanceto carve a dividing line betweenjointly-guaranteed debt and the rest. National borrowings below the 60% level could beswitched into blue Eurobonds, while the remaining red debt would remain theresponsibility of individual states. The blue bit would cover around 5.5 trillion Euroa lotmore than Mr Boonstra s plan, and it would be for keeps. The main objection to thiscolour-coded proposal is that the resulting pressure on countries to reduce their red debtcould backfire. The now-riskier tranche of borrowing would turn toxic, with yields on itsoaring as borrowers priced in the higher risk of default. In the ensuing panic, theguarantee would probably have to be extended. The limit for blue debt would turn out tobe as binding a constraint as the original Maastricht ceiling.

　　早在2010年，總部位于布魯塞爾的智庫機構勃魯蓋爾便提出了一個更為大膽的計劃。該計劃試圖利用原《馬斯特里赫特條約》中各國公共債務不得超過GDP60%的條款盡管這一規定很少被遵守，常常被違反將債券分成兩類，即共同擔保債券和傳統的主權債券。主權債務中低于GDP60%的部分將劃到藍色歐洲債券中，60%以上的部分是紅色債券，仍由各國獨自承擔還款責任。藍色歐洲債券的價值接近55億歐元大大超過了布恩斯塔計劃中的規模，而且它會是一種永久性債券。有人對這種顏色分類債券提出異議，認為這種債券的本意雖然是想迫使各國減少紅色債券，但很可能起到適得其反的效果?，F存的高風險債券一旦劃成紅色債券將變成問題資產，由于違約風險升高，政府的借款利率也將隨之猛增。隨后，市場將陷入一片恐慌之中，此種形勢下，共同擔保的范圍不得不擴大，把紅色債券也納入進來。到頭來，藍色債券的范圍界限毫無約束力可言，正如同當初《馬斯特里赫特條約》設定的公共債務上限的條款一樣，淪為一紙空文。

　　A third proposalfrom the German Council of Economic Experts, an independent advisorygrouprecodes the colours and changes the intent. Eurobonds would replace national debtabove, rather than below, 60% of GDP. This scheme would be smaller than Bruegel s,covering around 2.3 trillion Euro, and since its purpose is to redeem debt above the 60%threshold, the fund issuing the Eurobonds would eventually wind upthough that would take25 years. The ultimate objective is manageable national rather than permanent jointdebt.

　　第三套方案來自一家獨立的顧問團體，即德國經濟專家委員。他們對顏色債券賦予了不同的含義，發債的目的也有了變化。在這份計劃中，歐洲債券將替代超出GDP60%以上的部分的國家債務。該計劃將發行大約價值2.3萬億歐元的債券，小于勃魯蓋爾方案的規模。該計劃的目的是償還超出60%上限以上部分的債券，因此一旦實現目標，負責歐洲債券的發行的基金也將最終停止運行盡管可能要花上25年的時間。此一方案的最終目標是實現可管理的國家債務，而非永久性的共同債務。

　　Let s try another colour scheme

　　試試其他顏色的計劃

　　Since Greece, Portugal and Ireland cannot transfer debt into the fund while they are beingbailed out, the German plan can be interpreted as a roundabout rescue for Italy. With publicdebt at 120% of GDP, Italy would transfer almost 1 trillion Euro into the fund as existingnational debt came due and was replaced by the issuance of joint bonds. The next-highestamountover 500 billion Eurowould come from Germany, whose fiscal standing is not indoubt .

　　由于希臘、葡萄牙和愛爾蘭三國正在接受資金救助，它們的債券將不會轉入償還基金，因此人們將德國方案視作是對意大利的曲線救援。意大利的公共債務占到了GDP的120%，隨著國家債務到期日的日益接近，大約有1萬億歐元的意大利債券將轉入償還基金，并由共同擔保債券取而代之。德國將向償還基金注入5千億歐元的債券，排名第二。德國目前的財政狀況仍然良好。

　　The plan would need to be tweaked to help countries such as Spain, whose public debt is notfar above the 60% limit but is rising sharply and may surge even more if its weak savingsbanks need extra help. Another issue is whether the discipline needed to pay off debt oversuch a long period can be sustained. But the plan should avoid the perverse effects ofBruegel s blue-red proposal. Yields on existing national bonds in a country such asItalythose with maturities extending beyond the transfer period of up to four yearswillbe higher than those issued through the redemption fund, but overall borrowing costs shouldbe reduced as investors see a credible path to debt reduction and fret less about a eurobreak-up.

　　這一計劃還需要做作少許修改，以適應救助西班牙等國的需要。西班牙的公共債務只是略高于60%的上限，但近來上升勢頭很猛。考慮到該國虛弱的儲蓄銀行可能需要額外的救助，公共債務還有大幅激增的可能性。另一個要注意的問題是，歐洲債券的償還需要很長的一段時間，保證還款正常進行的紀律能否得到維持?盡管有以上各種問題，這一計劃仍將避免勃魯蓋爾的藍債券-紅債券的弊端。意大利等國發行的債券期限超出了四年的轉換期，收益率也會高于那些由償還基金代發的歐洲債券的收益率。但它們的總借款成本還是會有所下降，這是因為一旦投資者看到債務確實在減少，他們對歐元解體的憂慮便會得到緩解的緣故。

　　Of the three schemes, the German plan has most to commend it. It insists on toughconditionality: states being helped will have to provide the fund with collateral andearmarked tax revenue. It is also open about the fact that German borrowing costs will rise,by up to a percentage point. That is an awkward truth, but Germans will also pay if thesingle currency fails. From a poor starting-point, the German proposal is the least bad wayforward.

　　三個方案中，德國版本最為受到推崇。該方案堅持嚴格的限制性條件，即：受助國必須向基金提供專項的的稅收收入作為抵押品。毫無疑問，德國的借款成本將會由此增加，大約上升一個百分點。成本上升的事實頗為令人尷尬，但換個角度看，如果歐元破產，德國還是要付出相應的代價。歐洲債券已經站在了糟糕透頂的起點之上，而德國的方案代表著最不壞的前進方向。

　　Joined-up thinking

　　以整體思維設計歐洲債券

　　Can a limited version of Eurobonds help solve theeuro crisis?

　　限制版的歐洲債券能否解決歐債危機?

　　Anyone labouring under the illusion that the eurocrisis could be solved by liquidity provision fromthe European Central Bank , howevermunificent, has been disabused. By encouragingbanks to stock up on domestic government debt, the ECB s loans have reinforced thepernicious links between weak banks and weak governments. That connection is currentlyhurting Spain. Meanwhile, a German-inspired fiscal compact to insert public-debt brakesinto national laws does nothing to help countries such as Italy climb out of the debt pit.

　　人們曾經對歐洲央行抱有不切實際的想法，認為只要它增加流動性供給，歐債危機便能藥到病除。但現實情況是，無論歐洲央行出手怎么慷慨大方，依然無法扭轉局勢。歐洲央行向銀行業發放貸款，鼓勵它們購買自己國家發行的政府債券。各國銀行和政府本就已經虛弱不堪，上述做法更加加劇了二者之間的極為有害的聯系。西班牙現在便深受這種毒害之苦。與此同時，德國發起的財政契約要求各國將控制公共債務水平的條款納入本國法律中，這絲毫無益于西班牙這樣深陷債務泥潭的國家獲得救助。

　　Eurobonds, shorthand for euro-area sovereign debts that are jointly guaranteed by the 17member countries, could provide a solution. In aggregate, the public finances of thecurrency block compare favourably with countries such as America which can borrow atdirt-cheap rates . But replacing all national government bonds with collectively underwrittendebt is a non-starter. A fully mutualised euro-zone debt market would be enormousat 8trillion Euro, not far short of America sand thus very liquid.

　　歐洲債券是歐元區主權債券的縮寫。這種由十七個國家聯合擔保的債券可能為解決歐債危機提供某種出路。總的來看，歐元區集團的公共財政狀況與美國相比毫不遜色，但是卻無法享受到后者那種以極低的利率借款的好處。。但因此取消歐元區所有國家的政府債券，并代之以各國共同承保的歐洲債券，無疑又是不現實的。一個完全統一的歐元區債券市場將極為龐大市值約為8萬億歐元，接近美國債券市場的規模從而也將極具流動性。

　　That would lower average borrowing costs a bit. But the big gains through lower yields wouldgo to the block s fiscal sinners , while the good guys would becharged more to tap the markets than they are now. Such a move risks undermining the euroarea s public finances in the long run by taking pressure off renegades. To prevent that,national budgets would have to be tightly controlled at a euro-zone level, entailing muchdeeper political integration than is currently conceivable.

　　若這一設想得以實現，歐元區的平均借款成本將會有少許的下降。到那時，敗壞財政紀律的罪犯將享受到債券收益率下降的好處，而行為端正的好人則要承受比現在更高的發債成本。從長期來看，這種為惡棍緩解壓力的做法將毀壞歐元區的公共財政基礎。若要避免此種不幸，各國的財政預算必須從歐元區總體層面上加以嚴格控制，這勢必要求各國打破思想上的框框，將政治一體化的進程向前繼續推進。

　　Any feasible plan for Eurobonds will therefore have to be on a partial basis. That meanslimiting the scope of joint guarantees to specific portions of member states sovereigndebt, or setting a defined lifespan to the guarantees. One idea is to confine the maturityof Eurobonds to short-term debt. Wim Boonstra, chief economist of Rabobank in theNetherlands, advocates a facility for euro-zone countries to finance themselves for four yearsthrough jointly-guaranteed debt of up to two years in maturity. This plan would excludeGreece, Ireland and Portugal while they are receiving rescue finance, but it would take theheat off Italy and Spain and provide their banks with a safe common asset. One snag is that itencompasses the very maturity at which their governments already find it easiest to borrow.Another is that by encouraging countries to issue debt at shorter maturities, the programmewould create a bigger refinancing hump at the point when it was wound up.

　　無論歐洲債券采取何種發行方案，都將是一個類似半成品的事物。這意味著，或者成員國主權債務的某些部分，或者債券的期限，將受到限制。有人就建議將歐洲債券界定為短期債務工具。荷蘭拉博銀行首席經濟學家維姆布恩斯塔主張，歐元區國家應采取聯合擔保的形式，發行一種單期期限不超過兩年，總期限四年的共同融資工具。按照他的計劃，一方面，希臘、愛爾蘭和葡萄牙由于已經接受了救助資金，將不會成為聯合擔保的對象;另一方面，意大利和西班牙將由此獲得喘息的機會，兩國的銀行業也將獲得歐洲債券這種比較安全的一般性資產。但是這個方案存在的一大問題是，即使沒有歐洲債券，意大利政府和西班牙政府現在已經能比較輕松地獲得這一期限內的貸款。況且，如果各國在這一方案的激勵下都來發行短期債券，那么等到借新還舊的時候就會面對更大的融資壓力。

　　A much more ambitious scheme from Bruegel, a Brussels-based think-tank, first outlinedin 2010, would use the original Maastricht-treaty cap for public debt of 60% of GDPmorehonoured in the breach than the observanceto carve a dividing line betweenjointly-guaranteed debt and the rest. National borrowings below the 60% level could beswitched into blue Eurobonds, while the remaining red debt would remain theresponsibility of individual states. The blue bit would cover around 5.5 trillion Euroa lotmore than Mr Boonstra s plan, and it would be for keeps. The main objection to thiscolour-coded proposal is that the resulting pressure on countries to reduce their red debtcould backfire. The now-riskier tranche of borrowing would turn toxic, with yields on itsoaring as borrowers priced in the higher risk of default. In the ensuing panic, theguarantee would probably have to be extended. The limit for blue debt would turn out tobe as binding a constraint as the original Maastricht ceiling.

　　早在2010年，總部位于布魯塞爾的智庫機構勃魯蓋爾便提出了一個更為大膽的計劃。該計劃試圖利用原《馬斯特里赫特條約》中各國公共債務不得超過GDP60%的條款盡管這一規定很少被遵守，常常被違反將債券分成兩類，即共同擔保債券和傳統的主權債券。主權債務中低于GDP60%的部分將劃到藍色歐洲債券中，60%以上的部分是紅色債券，仍由各國獨自承擔還款責任。藍色歐洲債券的價值接近55億歐元大大超過了布恩斯塔計劃中的規模，而且它會是一種永久性債券。有人對這種顏色分類債券提出異議，認為這種債券的本意雖然是想迫使各國減少紅色債券，但很可能起到適得其反的效果。現存的高風險債券一旦劃成紅色債券將變成問題資產，由于違約風險升高，政府的借款利率也將隨之猛增。隨后，市場將陷入一片恐慌之中，此種形勢下，共同擔保的范圍不得不擴大，把紅色債券也納入進來。到頭來，藍色債券的范圍界限毫無約束力可言，正如同當初《馬斯特里赫特條約》設定的公共債務上限的條款一樣，淪為一紙空文。

　　A third proposalfrom the German Council of Economic Experts, an independent advisorygrouprecodes the colours and changes the intent. Eurobonds would replace national debtabove, rather than below, 60% of GDP. This scheme would be smaller than Bruegel s,covering around 2.3 trillion Euro, and since its purpose is to redeem debt above the 60%threshold, the fund issuing the Eurobonds would eventually wind upthough that would take25 years. The ultimate objective is manageable national rather than permanent jointdebt.

　　第三套方案來自一家獨立的顧問團體，即德國經濟專家委員。他們對顏色債券賦予了不同的含義，發債的目的也有了變化。在這份計劃中，歐洲債券將替代超出GDP60%以上的部分的國家債務。該計劃將發行大約價值2.3萬億歐元的債券，小于勃魯蓋爾方案的規模。該計劃的目的是償還超出60%上限以上部分的債券，因此一旦實現目標，負責歐洲債券的發行的基金也將最終停止運行盡管可能要花上25年的時間。此一方案的最終目標是實現可管理的國家債務，而非永久性的共同債務。

　　Let s try another colour scheme

　　試試其他顏色的計劃

　　Since Greece, Portugal and Ireland cannot transfer debt into the fund while they are beingbailed out, the German plan can be interpreted as a roundabout rescue for Italy. With publicdebt at 120% of GDP, Italy would transfer almost 1 trillion Euro into the fund as existingnational debt came due and was replaced by the issuance of joint bonds. The next-highestamountover 500 billion Eurowould come from Germany, whose fiscal standing is not indoubt .

　　由于希臘、葡萄牙和愛爾蘭三國正在接受資金救助，它們的債券將不會轉入償還基金，因此人們將德國方案視作是對意大利的曲線救援。意大利的公共債務占到了GDP的120%，隨著國家債務到期日的日益接近，大約有1萬億歐元的意大利債券將轉入償還基金，并由共同擔保債券取而代之。德國將向償還基金注入5千億歐元的債券，排名第二。德國目前的財政狀況仍然良好。

　　The plan would need to be tweaked to help countries such as Spain, whose public debt is notfar above the 60% limit but is rising sharply and may surge even more if its weak savingsbanks need extra help. Another issue is whether the discipline needed to pay off debt oversuch a long period can be sustained. But the plan should avoid the perverse effects ofBruegel s blue-red proposal. Yields on existing national bonds in a country such asItalythose with maturities extending beyond the transfer period of up to four yearswillbe higher than those issued through the redemption fund, but overall borrowing costs shouldbe reduced as investors see a credible path to debt reduction and fret less about a eurobreak-up.

　　這一計劃還需要做作少許修改，以適應救助西班牙等國的需要。西班牙的公共債務只是略高于60%的上限，但近來上升勢頭很猛。考慮到該國虛弱的儲蓄銀行可能需要額外的救助，公共債務還有大幅激增的可能性。另一個要注意的問題是，歐洲債券的償還需要很長的一段時間，保證還款正常進行的紀律能否得到維持?盡管有以上各種問題，這一計劃仍將避免勃魯蓋爾的藍債券-紅債券的弊端。意大利等國發行的債券期限超出了四年的轉換期，收益率也會高于那些由償還基金代發的歐洲債券的收益率。但它們的總借款成本還是會有所下降，這是因為一旦投資者看到債務確實在減少，他們對歐元解體的憂慮便會得到緩解的緣故。

　　Of the three schemes, the German plan has most to commend it. It insists on toughconditionality: states being helped will have to provide the fund with collateral andearmarked tax revenue. It is also open about the fact that German borrowing costs will rise,by up to a percentage point. That is an awkward truth, but Germans will also pay if thesingle currency fails. From a poor starting-point, the German proposal is the least bad wayforward.

　　三個方案中，德國版本最為受到推崇。該方案堅持嚴格的限制性條件，即：受助國必須向基金提供專項的的稅收收入作為抵押品。毫無疑問，德國的借款成本將會由此增加，大約上升一個百分點。成本上升的事實頗為令人尷尬，但換個角度看，如果歐元破產，德國還是要付出相應的代價。歐洲債券已經站在了糟糕透頂的起點之上，而德國的方案代表著最不壞的前進方向。